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fN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 2000844-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "wife") submits the following as 
her Reply to the Responsive Brief of the Appellee (hereinafter "Respondent" or "husband") in the 
above matter: 
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY 
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which is the Amended Decree 
of Divorce, is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the order appealed from is an Amended 
Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Does the lack of a trial transcript prevent the issues at bar from being considered 
by the Court of Appeals? 
LINDA LOU COLEMAN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
-vs-
KENNETH DOUGLAS COLEMAN, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
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B Are the trial court's findings of fact sufficient to support the trial court's 
conclusions regarding the amount and duration of alimony awarded to the Petitioner? 
C Can this Court determine from the record of trial the basis of the trial 
court's alimony award? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES 
There is no case law nor statutory authority believed by the Petitioner to be wholly 
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal However, Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 is relevant to 
this appeal 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P 2d 255 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court stated clearly 
that, if the Court of Appeals determines that the findings of fact are insufficient to support the 
legal conclusions of the trial court, the Court of Appeals should remand the matter for further 
proceedings Id "In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its 
decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice " Watson v. 
Watson, 837 P 2d 1, 3 (Utah App 1992), {citing Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P 2d 84, 90 (Utah 
App 1989) The courts will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court 
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards, and "supported its decision with 
adequate findings and conclusions '" Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P 2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App 
1988) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the final judgment and Amended Decree of Divorce entered in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Provo Division, State of Utah, the 
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Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Court Judge presiding, who, among other things, entered an 
order regarding alimony and attorney's fees. 
The Amended Decree of Divorce from which this appeal arises was entered on or about 
August 30, 2000. A notice of appeal was timely filed on behalf of the Petitioner on or about 
September 20, 2000. The Petitioner filed for divorce in the trial court. Responsive pleadings were 
filed and the matter came before the lower court for trial on April 5, 2000. The court took the 
matter under advisement and issued its Memorandum Decision on April 10, 2000. The Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as the Amended Decree of Divorce, were based on the 
Memorandum Decision and were entered on August 30, 2000. It is from the Amended Decree of 
Divorce that the Petitioner has brought her appeal. 
There are no motions pending in the trial court pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b), 
54(b), or 59, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Petitioner has already stated the facts in her initial appellate brief to this Court. For 
the sake of brevity, those facts will not be restated here, but rather will be referred to in the 
Petitioner's brief as necessary. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to state with specificity the basis 
of its decision in making an award of alimony to the Petitioner in the above-entitled case. The 
trial court mentions the factors necessary for determining alimony awards pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §30-3-5 (1988), however, the trial court failed to apply the requirements of that 
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statutory regime to the facts of the case at bar The Respondent would have this Court believe 
that an absence of a trial transcript necessarily means that the presumption should enter that the 
findings of the trial court were supported by evidence in the record However, the Respondent 
fails to focus on the adequacy of the findings, which is the central issue on appeal It may well be 
that the evidence presented supports, or does not support, the determination of the trial judge in 
this matter However, absent findings that clearly state a basis for an award of alimony, neither 
the Petitioner nor this Court can determine what issues of clear error may have been committed 
by the trial court In short, it is the very nature of the Petitioner's claim on appeal that the 
Respondent would urge this Court to use as a basis for denying relief, that being a lack of clarity 
and specificity on the part of the trial court in fashioning the award of alimony granted the 
Petitioner 
The Respondent next urges this Court to consider the fact that the Petitioner's own 
counsel prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which was the basis of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce entered in this matter as being noteworthy Respondent implies that 
the Petitioner's claim should be viewed negatively because of this fact This argument has no 
merit The factual identity of the party ordered by the Court to prepare the final documents 
reflecting the decision of the Court as stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision is a function 
of practicality, not one of merit based fault The Petitioner's counsel had to prepare the pleadings 
as a matter of course, not as a matter of determining the adequacy of the trial court's actions In 
fact, had Petitioner's counsel tried to "clarify" or "clean up" the trial court's rulings, it would have 
been grossly unethical Further, given the fact that the Petitioner's counsel had only the 
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Memorandum Decision provided by Judge Gary D Stott to work with in fashioning the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it becomes clear why they so closely mirror the inadequate 
language found in that Memorandum Decision Judge Stott gave no insight as to the basis of his 
alimony award anywhere else but in that Memorandum Decision No information was given 
during the trial that would even remotely suggest what evidence presented by the parties was 
considered by the Court The Judge merely indicated at the close of evidence that he would 
carefully consider all the evidence presented before him and would do his best to make a fair 
decision in this matter, which would be delivered in written format to the parties' respective 
counsel at a later time 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE LACK OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT 
PREVENT THE COURT OF APPEALS FROM 
MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO THE 
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS AND NEED FOR 
REMAND. 
A The Respondent relies primarily on Sampson v. Richins, 770 P 2d 998 (Utah Ct 
App 1989) in making his argument that the Court of Appeals must find that the trial court's 
findings and decision were supported by adequate evidence from the record (Brief of Appellee, 
pages 5-6) However, in doing so the Respondent has shown a misunderstanding of the 
Petitioner's position in this matter It is at the heart of the Petitioner's claim on appeal that the 
trial court failed to state specifically and sufficiently what the trial court's basis was for entering 
the ruling it made on the issue of alimony Thus, any argument in regards to factual disputes over 
the findings is useless until such time as sufficient findings on all relevant issues can be examined 
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Only then will a transcript of the trial court hearing will be needed Until then, arguing over the 
facts and evidence submitted at trial is pointless as we cannot determine yet what facts the trial 
court found relevant 
The Court in Sampson stated specifically that "Where the record before us is incomplete, 
we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was 
supported by admissible and competent evidence " Id. at 1002 citing Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P 2d 
763, 765 (Utah 1985) AccordBevan v J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P 2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983) 
However, Sampson went on further to state that " the findings must themselves be sufficient 
to provide a sound foundation for the judgment, and conversely ' any proper judgment can 
only be entered in accordance with the findings ' Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P 2d 518, 519 (Utah 
1978) Therefore, our review is strictly limited to whether the trial court's findings of fact support 
its conclusions of law and judgment " Id 
In ignoring the above-relevant portion of Sampson, the Respondent also failed to discuss 
other relevant cases on point, such as Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank, 673 P 2d 590 (Utah 1983), 
which held that Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the trial court's 
" findings of fact must clearly indicate the 'mind of the court,' and must resolve all issues of 
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon 
Furthermore, failure of a trial court to enter adequate findings requires the judgment to be 
vacated " Id at 601 citing State ex rel. K.D.S.,, 578 P 2d 9, 11 (Utah 1978), Romrell v. Zions 
First National Bank 611 P 2d 392, 394-95 ( Utah, 1980), Boyer Company v. Lignell, 567 P 2d 
1112, 1113 (Utah, 1977), and Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P 2d 233, 236 (Utah, 1983) 
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It is clear from the discussion given in the initial brief of Appellant, and further discussion 
to be reviewed infra, that the trial court's findings in this matter do not "clearly indicate the mind 
of the court." Moreover, the reader has little ability to agree or disagree with the findings of the 
trial court in this matter as the findings are stated more from a standpoint of being conclusory 
statements as opposed to well articulated findings of fact. Of particular note in this regard would 
be what, if any, basis the trial court had for concluding that the Petitioner would be sufficiently 
able to provide for herself an adequate income equal to the standard of living enjoyed by the 
parties during the term of the marriage after the year 2005. (Memorandum Decision \ 4.) The 
trial court takes time to note the fact that length of marriage is one of the factors that should be 
considered in making an award of alimony (Memorandum Decision % 4), but fails to describe how 
the court factored that requirement into making its decision regarding the alimony award, as 
stated above. The Parks decision discussed above states further as follows: 
In addition to the rules set forth above regarding the sufficiency of the trial court's 
findings of fact, this Court has observed: 
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in 
a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the 
proper rule of law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." 
Id citing Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). 
POINT 2. THE WIFE CAN CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
LACK OF FINDINGS, EVEN WHERE HER COUNSEL 
PREPARED THE FINDINGS, SO LONG AS THE TRIAL 
COURT FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE INFORMATION 
WITH WHICH TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS . 
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The Respondent takes Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) out of context in an 
attempt to discredit the Petitioner in this case. In Jones, the trial court failed to give insight into 
the values of some disputed property items, the value of which was later raised on appeal. There, 
the wife had an opportunity to assign a value in the findings based upon the wife's own estimation 
of the value, and yet failed to state what those values were in her findings which were prepared by 
her counsel. Id at 1073. 
Jones is easily distinguished from the case at bar in that the Petitioner here has no way of 
divining from the conclusory statements made in the trial court's Memorandum Decision what 
formula for calculation the trial court used in arriving at the stated alimony award. Assigning 
value to one's marital property is within the purview of a party to estimate in making findings. 
The thought processes by which a judge makes an award of alimony is not. This is especially true 
considering that no insight was given by the court as to what weight the court gave the parties' 
relative lists of expenses as stated in their exhibits, what the court considered the parties' 
standards of living to be, or what the court considered the reasonable needs and ability to pay 
might be of both parties to this action. All of these factors are to be considered and stated with 
specificity for an award of alimony to be upheld. "We have held that the omission of particular 
findings in alimony awards is an abuse of discretion." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah 
App. 1990) {citingRuhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App 1987). Further, "The 
payor spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary step in determining the ability to provide 
support." Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Willey v. Willey 
866 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1993)). "The trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on 
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the three enumerated [Jones] factors, and we will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant 
facts are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgement.'" 
Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 880 (citing Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah App. 1991), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)). As was shown earlier, the court in this matter stated 
which factors the court was to consider, but then gave no insight as to how the court considered 
these factors. No clearer example can be shown than the lack of insight given to the trial court's 
consideration of the duration for which the trial court awarded the Petitioner alimony. The trial 
court stated that alimony should terminate after 2005, (Memorandum Decision f^ 4 page 4), and 
yet the trial court gives no basis for why alimony should terminate after the year 2005. Absent 
adequate findings, the Petitioner can only assume that no basis exists and the determination was 
arbitrary and capricious. 
However, the Respondent would have the court hold that, because the Petitioner failed to 
invent reasons on her own, this court should penalize her for asking for clarification and review of 
the cryptic decision given to her by the trial court. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in this matter are only as vague and lacking as the source from which they flowed. Were this 
court to rule that the Petitioner is barred from seeking clarification and review of the decision of 
the trial court merely because her counsel prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
that represent the trial court's flawed decision, this would have a significant "chilling effect" on 
the willingness of any party ever to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in any case 
for fear that by doing so they may be waiving their right to appeal some or all of the issues 
decided in that action. 
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POINT 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT ASSUME WHAT 
BASIS THE TRIAL COURT USED TO DETERMINE ITS 
AWARD OF ALIMONY TO THE WIFE, ABSENT A CLEAR 
INDICATION FROM THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Respondent spends a great deal of time surmising on pages 8-12 of the Brief of 
Appellee what the Respondent assumes might be the basis for the trial court's determination of 
the award of alimony for the Petitioner in this matter. However, the Respondent's calculations are 
the stuff of fantasy. The Respondent discusses on page 10 of his Brief what the Respondent 
believes to be the reasonable basis for calculating expenses of the Petitioner and Respondent were 
at the time of trial, making deductions for his various debts and child support and alimony 
arrearage obligations, and arrives at figures that the Respondent hopes are in line with the 
thinking of the trial court in making the award of alimony. However, this entire line of reasoning 
is speculative because the trial court did not articulate this method of calculation anywhere in the 
Memorandum Decision, which was, as stated earlier, the only articulated information that the trial 
court gave on the issue of alimony. During the actual hearing in question, the Judge declined to 
comment on the sufficiency of any piece of evidence relating to the issue of alimony during trial, 
except to allow the evidence to be admitted into evidence. All comments regarding the evidence 
submitted in this matter were reserved for the Memorandum Decision delivered by the Judge on 
April 10, 2000. 
The Respondent acknowledges that the trial court failed to explain why the court's award 
of alimony terminates in 2005. (Brief of Appellee page 11). However, the Respondent contends 
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that this is not a fatal flaw, as this Court can still affirm judgment of the trial court if all the 
relevant facts support a finding in favor of judgment. Furthermore, Respondent's urges this Court 
to assume the wife has admitted to the sufficiency of the findings of the trial court due to her 
failure to provide a transcript. As discussed above, the reasoning of the Respondent in this regard 
is flawed in that it requires this Court to ferret out from the exhibits of the trial court and the 
supposition of the Respondent the reasoning supporting the trial court's decisions. In short, the 
Respondent is asking this Court to fully support and explain and support the decision of the trial 
court instead of enforcing the policy that it is properly the job of the trial court to do its' own 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Findings of Fact should "...clearly indicate the 'mind 
of the court." Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank, 673 P. 2d 590 (Utah 1983), as discussed earlier. 
The Respondent cites to Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah App. 1998), in stating 
that no requirement exists for the court to make an award of alimony that lasts forever, or even 
the length of the marriage (Brief of Appellee page 12). However, the Respondent failed to 
address the critical distinction the Petitioner made in her initial brief between that case and the 
case at bar. To briefly restate the distinction, the court in Childs found that limiting the award to 
the recipient spouse to less than the length of the parties' marriage appropriate "...considering the 
duration of the marriage [approximately 6 years], [recipient's] excellent health, youth, and ability 
to improve her capacity to meet her own needs, and her fault in engaging in an extramarital 
affair." Id. The case at bar reflects that the Petitioner was involved in a long term marriage of 26 
years, is 52 years old, and was found to have no marketable jobs skills other than those necessary 
to obtain a minimum wage job. 
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Further, the Respondent's Brief chooses to omit from his discussion the mandatory 
authority on the subject of alimony awards as they relate to the length of marriage found in 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), which held that alimony awards in marriages of 
long duration should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' standard of living as close as 
possible to that enjoyed during the marriage. Id at 1081. 
Finally, the Respondent admits in his own brief that the trial court did not articulate 
specific findings in making its alimony award when the Respondent suggests that on remand, 
u[t]he trial court may be able to enter specific findings describing how it reached its decision." 
(Brief of Appellee page 12). 
POINT 4. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
The Petitioner holds to her original argument for attorney's fees on appeal as stated in her 
Brief of Appellant found on pages 24-26. '"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded 
to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.'" 
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171 (Utah App. 1990)). See alsoMunns v. Munns, 
790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990) (citingRasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah 
App. 1988). 
Respondent argues that since all the Petitioner is looking for on appeal is a remand, she 
should not be entitled to fees unless she prevails on remand. However, if the Petitioner seeks 
remand from appeal, then a remand should be considered a prevailing circumstance. Thus her fees 
should be awarded. Further, in the event that the remand is with instructions consistent with an 
award that would allow the Petitioner to prevail, the court should grant fees now. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in this case should be remanded for further hearing with specific instructions 
in regard to findings and the determination of the Petitioner's alimony award. The allegations of 
the Respondent that the Petitioner's arguments are fatally flawed by her failure to provide a 
written transcript of the trial is incorrect, as the thrust of Petitioner's claims is that the findings are 
not specifically articulated enough to give adequate insight or support for the trial court's 
decision. The Respondent uses circular reasoning to describe why the Petitioner should be 
penalized for not inventing her own factual support for an award of alimony that the Petitioner 
does not believe is valid, merely because the Petitioner's counsel was instructed to prepare the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and ignores the fact that the Petitioner's counsel was 
left inadequate resources to make proper findings because of the incomplete Memorandum 
Decision of the trial court. 
The Respondent's arguments as to the adequacy of the alimony award determination are 
pure speculation. The Respondent's own brief acknowledges the lack of specificity in the trial 
court's decision regarding the lack of guidance as to why the trial court arbitrarily limited the 
payment of alimony by the Respondent to the year 2005, and arbitrarily reduced the amount after 
December 2000. 
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DATED this 19 day of /\,\/f V 2001 ) 
CORPORON & WILUAMS, PC 
JX= 
MARYtrCORPOI 
JARROD H JENNINGS 
Attorneys for Petitioner/ Appellant 
^
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon & Williams, 
attorneys for the Petitioner/Appellant herein, and that I caused the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to 
be served upon Respondent/Appellee, by mailing two true and correct copies of the same in an 
envelope, postage pre-paid, and addressed to: 
LESLIE W SLAUGH 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
P.O. Box 1248 
12 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84603 
' ) 
on the 2_°1 day of M j "V 2001. 
CORPORON &, WILLIAMS 
MARY C CORPORON 
JARROD H. JENNINGS 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
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